Media, culture, and politics from an aesthetic-materialist's perspective.

Showing posts with label originalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label originalism. Show all posts

Friday, April 4, 2008

Scalia Q&A: Idiots, Hecklers, and Bad Jokes

I found this clip of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia responding to audience questions at an event in which he was talking about the role of international law in U.S. courts. As a practitioner of interpretive originalism, Scalia is vehemently against either the direct quotation or even the faintest consultation of international law to help decide U.S. cases.

The clip doesn't include Scalia's talk, but it picks up with Q&A and highlights Scalia's skirmishes with a handful of foolish, tasteless, and otherwise dim audience members. I'm a self-identified progressive, and goodness knows Scalia is in desperate need of public intellectual skewering. But this? These "critics" -- all of them college-aged, it seems -- crack terrible jokes (about Dick Cheney's hunting incident), speak as though they were forcing their words through a meat grinder, and are clearly uninterested in engaging in civil, public debate.

The worst of the lot, the first questioner, prefaces his question -- "Do you support Carl Schmitt's dogma of the unitary executive?" -- with a rambling and pompous "introduction," in which he mistakenly refers to the Justice as "Anton Scalia." When the Justice asks him if he has a question to pose, the guy says, "Plato has a question for you." This bespectacled dodo is later escorted out of the room after heckling Scalia one too many times.

Wednesday, August 8, 2007

Originalism's Dead Letter

An article on Slate.com by Doug Kendall and Jim Ryan scrutinizes recent opinions written by Associate Justice Clarence Thomas and finds that the self-proclaimed originalist is not as principled as his judicial philosophy would seem to demand. In Kendall and Ryan's analysis, Justice Thomas applies the doctrine of originalism neither coherently nor consistently but partially and selectively.

In two important cases from last term, Morse v. Frederick and Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., Thomas at once denied a student's freedom of speech in a public high school and asserted a corporation's freedom of speech in sponsoring ads (past a deadline established by the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act) during a public election. The problem is that in one case, Morse, Thomas invoked the "Founders" to declare that "they" never thought of granting students First Amendment rights in public schools, while in the other, FEC, Thomas concluded that corporations held the same free-speech right as individuals (though not students in public schools), despite the fact that the Founders' generation was more inclined to believe that corporations are, in Chief Justice John Marshall's words, "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of the law."

Kendall and Ryan do a masterful job of deconstructing Thomas's "logic" here. By originalist standards, the second opinion, FEC, is downright unsupportable. The texts of the earliest constitutional law in the United States nowhere grant corporations -- which did exist at the time -- the same rights as individuals. A corporation was considered a legal fiction, not a living, breathing citizen like you or me. And yet the professed originalist, Thomas, somehow managed to overlook that body of textual evidence in supporting the majority decision penned by Chief Justice John Roberts and joined by Associate Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito.

Even in Morse, where Thomas applied schoolboy historicism to say that the Founders never granted students free-speech rights (public schools didn't exist at the time), Kendall and Ryan point out that a bonafide originalist reading might have yielded a different result. Originalism, they argue, doesn't simply ask, "Did the Founders knowingly and intentionally formulate this or that right?" Rather, originalism inheres in a fidelity to textual meaning -- a way of reading the Constitution in its most robust and principled form. A true originalist, Kendall and Ryan posit, would argue that "the meaning of the text... must be paramount over the subjective expectations of any individual, whether alive or dead."

Originalists say they are merely reading the Constitution to the letter. Kendall and Ryan suggest they aren't: those like Thomas are intentionalists (my term), not originalists -- they don't actually read, or interpret, the Constitution but rely on the dubious assertion that because certain things didn't exist in the eighteenth century (like public schools), the Founders couldn't possibly have legitimated any constitutional "right" relating to them. This "argument" is so facile it's insulting to anyone forced to listen to it. "Didn't exist, so couldn't have been" -- like a kid sticking his pointer fingers in his ears and singing, "La la la la la," to drown out his interlocutor's more persuasive claim.

By now it should be clear that originalism doesn't read the Constitution to the letter -- it renders the Constitution a dead letter, a document that, in itself, is utterly meaningless, because, remember, it's not what the text says or means but whether or not this or that existed when the Founders actually lived. Thus, with the passing of the Founders, so went all of our rights.

All of which is to say that Clarence Thomas is neither an originalist nor a particularly good jurist. For between his intentionalism in Morse and his outright business-friendly partisanship in FEC, it's clear that Thomas is nothing but a results-minded arch-conservative who hands down incoherent but consequential decisions on the U.S. Supreme Court. His supporters will congratulate Thomas on his courage and consistency, but if one were to take the time to read and compare his cases alongside each other (as Kendall and Ryan do), one would be hard pressed to find a shred of recognizable constitutional insight in them.

Monday, May 7, 2007

A Dirty Shame: Partial Law & Strict Interpretation

My friend Tyrone Kapricorne brought to my attention a lawsuit filed in Washington, D.C., that exposes the corruption of the American legal system by frivolous, "bad faith" torts. Most amazing (aside from the amount of money being requested in damages) about this suit is that it was filed by a D.C. judge himself.

You can read about the suit yourself in this article by AP writer Lubna Takruri. The suit was filed by one Roy Pearson, an administrative hearings judge for the D.C. circuit. Two years ago, Judge Pearson brought several suits that needed to be altered to a dry-cleaning business owned by a Korean immigrant family, the Chungs. When one of the judge's pants went "missing" a few days later, Pearson set in motion a series of events that culminated in his $65 million suit against the Chungs.

Now at first Pearson demanded that the Chungs reimburse him for the price of the suit (of which the pants was a part), more than $1,000. But one week later, the Chungs recovered the pants, without any damage, and simply wanted to return it to the judge. Pearson refused to accept this and, after several months of rejecting settlement offers by the Chungs (as much as $12,000!), instead filed his lawsuit.

How Judge Pearson arrived at the extraordinary figure of $65 million is too complicated (and too loathsome) for me to summarize here. So I'll defer to Lubna Takruri's excellent account:
Because Pearson no longer wanted to use his neighborhood dry cleaner, part of his lawsuit calls for $15,000 — the price to rent a car every weekend for 10 years to go to another business.

...

But the bulk of the $65 million comes from Pearson's strict interpretation of D.C.'s consumer protection law, which fines violators $1,500 per violation, per day. According to court papers, Pearson added up 12 violations over 1,200 days, and then multiplied that by three defendants.
Much of Pearson's case rests on two signs that Custom Cleaners once had on its walls: 'Satisfaction Guaranteed' and 'Same Day Service.'

Based on Pearson's dissatisfaction and the delay in getting back the pants, he claims the signs amount to fraud.
Remember, of course, that the pants were found, without any damage, by the Chungs only a week or two after they had presumed it had gone missing. And remember that despite Judge Pearson's clear unreasonableness, the Chungs were willing to pay as much as $12,000 to avoid going to court. The pants in question have been hanging in the Chungs' lawyer's office, untouched, for over a year. Amazingly, Pearson now claims this pair is not his, even though the inseam measurements match his own and the ticket matches his receipt.

How, then, are we supposed to judge the actions of Judge Pearson? In what ways can we understand law, and how it works, when one of its own administrators (or "interpreters") is so clearly intent on bending words and provisions and clauses to suit his personal needs? To what extent do Judge Pearson's actions reveal a larger culture of toxic litigation in the American legal system? And how uncommon is his strategy of reading, or interpreting, the law among supposedly impartial, freestanding judges and justices in a country that prides itself on having a legal system in which "justice is blind"?

Note Takruri's gloss on the reasoning behind Pearson's lawsuit: his is a "strict interpretation" of D.C. consumer law. For those unfamiliar with contemporary ideologies of legal interpretation, the "strict reading" of law is championed mainly by conservative judges who base their decisions on "literal" or "originalist" readings of legal documents. Pearson is a classic literalist when he argues that the Chungs' signs did not accord with the service he received -- he was literally "not satisfied" by his service (i.e., the Chungs couldn't guarantee his satisfaction), and though his pants were eventually recovered, this happened too late for "same day service" to apply here. And then of course we have Pearson's calculations, which inflate his assumed damages to extraordinary proportions and continue to assume that he is "damaged" every day that goes by without his pants being returned to him.

This case is a travesty, to be sure, but Pearson's legal ideology is in fact not at all uncommon. In addition to numerous judges at the state and federal levels, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas of the U.S. Supreme Court espouse extreme forms of literalism and originalism in their readings of the U.S. Constitution. For Scalia and Thomas, if the "framers" of the Constitution didn't intend something -- protection of certain rights, let's say -- in their writing up of that document, then it cannot be defended as constitutional. Scalia and Thomas have lambasted abortion rights and affirmative action policies, for example, for having no foundation whatsoever in the framers' understanding of what could be protected by law in American society. In their view, abortion is legalized by a radical reading of the Constitution's protection of "privacy" and affirmative action, which gives minorities an "unfair" advantage over whites, amounts to reverse racism and discounts the Constitution's understanding of "equal protection." Scalia defends his strategy of reading in an eloquent yet troubling book, A Matter of Interpretation. (Chief Justice Roberts is also by and large a literalist. Though I haven't the time to research his decision online, Roberts's tenure on the D.C. Circuit Court saw him uphold some form of harsh punishment for a girl who ate french fries in the subway when the subway's policy was that no food was allowed there.)

Given this thumbnail sketch of strict interpretation, what's revealing about the Pearson-Chung case, at least for me, is the way Judge Pearson's recourse to literalism is so clearly linked to a perverse pleasure in exercising power and making the law do what you say it does. I would go so far as to argue that Pearson's bad faith is in fact symptomatic of the literalist legal position: if your reading can be said to accord precisely with "what the law means" (or "what the framers intended"), and if there's an absolute coherence of your position and what you say the law says, then you confer upon yourself the authority of what Derrida calls "the force of law." You are the Law. This is the literalist ideology, and if you ask me it's not terribly different from the fundamentalist's claim that, knowing exactly what God means or intends, he acts in the name of God, with the force of God behind him. This is the literalist ideology, and it breeds hatred, disillusionment, and bad faith.

Pearson's case will be heard by D.C. Superior Court Judge Neal Kravitz on June 11 of this year. If you wish to help support the Chungs in their defense, please visit the Custom Cleaners Defense Fund.